Alter or Amend Judgment, Motion to (Rule 59.04)

Except as indicated, all indented material is copied directly from the court’s opinion.

Opinions of the Tennessee Supreme Court

Harmon v. Hickman Community Healthcare,  No. M2016-02374-SC-R11-CV, 594 S.W.2d 297, 305-06 (Tenn. 2020).

It is well-settled that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Stovall, 113 S.W.3d at 721; Linkous v. Lane, 276 S.W.3d 917, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). This Court has described the abuse of discretion standard in some detail:

The abuse of discretion standard of review envisions a less rigorous review of the lower court’s decision and a decreased likelihood that the decision will be reversed on appeal. It reflects an awareness that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable alternatives. Thus, it does not permit reviewing courts to second-guess the court below, or to substitute their discretion for the lower court’s. The abuse of discretion standard of review does not, however, immunize a lower court’s decision from any meaningful appellate scrutiny.

Discretionary decisions must take the applicable law and the relevant facts into account. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays beyond the applicable legal standards or when it fails to properly consider the factors customarily used to guide the particular discretionary decision. A court abuses its discretion when it causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.

Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted); see also BIF, a Div. of Gen. Signals Controls, Inc. v. Serv. Const. Co., No. 87-136-II, 1988 WL 72409, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 1988) (citations omitted) (“The standard conveys two notions. First, it indicates that the trial court has the authority to choose among several legally permissible, sometimes even conflicting, answers. Second, it indicates that the appellate court will not interfere with the trial court’s decision simply because it did not choose the alternative the appellate court would have chosen.”).

Lee Medical provided the framework for determining whether a trial court has properly exercised its discretion:

To avoid result-oriented decisions or seemingly irreconcilable precedents, reviewing courts should review a lower court’s discretionary decision to determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the lower court properly identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the lower court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.

Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 524-25 (citing Flautt & Mann v. Council of City of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d 856, 872-73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting BIF, 1988 WL 72409, at *3)); see also Vodafone Americas Holdings, 306*306 Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Roberts, 486 S.W.3d 496, 514 (Tenn. 2016).

Applying this framework, we look first at whether the factual basis for the trial court’s decision is supported by evidence in the record. Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 524. Here, the facts pertinent to Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend are largely undisputed, and the majority on the Court of Appeals did not disagree with the facts recited by the trial court.

The second question in the Lee Medical framework is whether the trial court identified and applied the legal principles relevant to its decision on Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend. Id. Because the motion to alter or amend relied on newly-submitted evidence, the trial court utilized the factors articulated in Stovall v. Clarke. The majority on the Court of Appeals agreed that these were the correct legal principles for the trial court’s decision. Harmon, 2018 WL 3267080, at *3. We agree as well.

The real issue in this case is with the third question in the Lee Medical framework, whether the trial court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. The majority on the Court of Appeals meticulously applied all of the Stovall factors to the pertinent facts and determined that, in the interest of justice, Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend should be granted. Id. at *5-9. This would have been a perfectly valid decision—had it been made by a trial court. However, the fact that the Court of Appeals reached a different result in applying the Stovall factors to the facts does not answer the essential question of whether the trial court’s decision was “within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 524.

We have emphasized the limitations inherent in the abuse of discretion standard:

[T]he abuse of discretion standard of review does not permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, because, by their very nature, discretionary decisions involve a choice among acceptable alternatives, reviewing courts will not second-guess a trial court’s exercise of its discretion simply because the trial court chose an alternative that the appellate courts would not have chosen. Accordingly, if the reviewing court determines that reasonable minds can disagree with the propriety of the decision, the decision should be affirmed.

State v. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tenn. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a]ppellate courts have the task of articulating the boundaries of the permissible range of the trial court’s options.” BIF, 1988 WL 72409, at *3. Respectfully, the majority on the Court of Appeals failed to do so in this case.

Opinions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals

Sanders v. Higgins, No. M2022-00892-COA-R3-CV, p. 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2023).

Glover v. Duckhorn, No. W2022-00697-COA-R3-CV, p. 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2023).

Augustin v. Tennessee Dept. of Safety and Homeland Security No. E2021-00635-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2022).

We review the denial of a motion to alter or amend under an abuse of discretion standard. Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court “(1) appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, (2) reach[es] an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) bas[es] its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010).

Walker v. McMillin,  No. M2020-01507-COA-R3-CV, p. 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.11, 2022).

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend under an abuse of discretion standard. See Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn. 2020). The abuse of discretion standard does not allow reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the trial court. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). Still, the abuse of discretion standard does not “immunize a [trial] court’s decision from any meaningful appellate scrutiny”:

To avoid result-oriented decisions or seemingly irreconcilable precedents, reviewing courts should review a [trial] court’s discretionary decision to determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the [trial] court properly identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the [trial] court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.

Id.

Estate of Martha Harrison Bane v. Bane, No. E2020-00978-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2022)

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Linkous v. Lane, 276 S.W.3d 917, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003)).

Thompson v. Thompson, No. M2020-01293-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2022)

The matters at issue were first raised in Wife’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 Motion to Alter or Amend the Final Order. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59.04 for an abuse of discretion. Linkous v. Lane, 276 S.W.3d 917, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003)). Pursuant to this standard, we review a trial court’s decision to determine, where applicable, whether there is a factual basis for the decision in the record, whether the court properly identified and applied the applicable legal principles, and whether the decision is within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010).

Our review of a trial court’s determinations on issues of law is de novo, without any presumption of correctness. See Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011).

Neff v. Wood, No. M2020-00748-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2022).

[T]the Woods complain that the court erred in granting the Neffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 59.04. We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn. 2020). A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard, reaches “an illogical or unreasonable decision,” or bases its decision “on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010).