Marital Estate, Division of

Except as indicated, all indented material is copied directly from the court’s opinion.

Decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court

Opinions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals

Barnes v. Barnes, No. M2022-00328-COA-R3-CV, p. 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2023).

Prichard v. Prichard, No. W2022-00728-COA-R3-CV, p. 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2023).

Once the parties’ property is classified and valued, “the marital property must then be divided equitably between the divorcing spouses, without regard to the fault of either party.” Id. at *5 (citing Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 246); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(a)(1) (“In all actions for divorce . . . , the court having jurisdiction thereof may, upon request of either party, . . . equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital fault in proportions as the court deems just.”). “A trial court’s decision regarding equitable division of marital property ‘is not a mechanical one and is not rendered inequitable because it is not precisely equal or because both parties did not receive a share of each piece of property.’” Id. (quoting Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 168). “The trial court is empowered to do what is reasonable under the circumstances and has broad discretion in the equitable division of the marital estate.” Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 328. We give “great weight to a trial court’s decisions regarding the division of marital assets, and we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support, misapplies statutory requirements or procedures, or results in some error of law.” Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 245 (citing Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 327).

Webb v. Webb, No. W2021-01227-COA-R3-CV, p. 3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2023).

Our review of the trial court’s factual findings is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d). We give great deference to the trial court’s credibility assessments. Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). We do not disturb “factual findings based on witness credibility unless clear and convincing evidence supports a different finding.” Coleman Mgmt., Inc. v. Meyer, 304 S.W.3d 340, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). We review questions of law de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013).

The trial court has broad discretion to fashion an equitable division of marital property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (2021);2 Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tenn. 2003). The factors in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) should guide the division. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d at 650; Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Trial courts must weigh the relevant factors in light of the proof presented at trial. Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tenn. 2010); Batson, 769 S.W.2d at 859. We will defer to the trial court’s decision “unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.” Larsen-Ball, 301 S.W.3d at 234 (citation omitted).

Cooke v. Cooke, No. E2022-00049-COA-R3-CV, p. 7 (Dec. 27, 2022).

Trial judges have wide latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property, see Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983); Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 168, and appellate courts accord great weight to a trial judge’s division of marital property. See Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). Thus, we will ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bombacino v. Bombacino, No. E2021-01261-COA-R3-CV, p. 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2022).

The trial court’s division of the marital estate is given deference on appeal:

This Court gives great weight to a trial court’s decisions regarding the division of marital assets, and we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support, misapplies statutory requirements or procedures, or results in some error of law. Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). As to the trial court’s findings of fact, “we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary.” Id. However, we accord no presumption of correctness to the trial court’s conclusions of law. Id.

Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240, 245–46 (Tenn. 2009).

Gergel v. Gergel, No. E2020-01534-COA-R3-CV, p. 11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2022).

In a case involving the proper classification and distribution of assets incident to a divorce, our Supreme Court has explained the applicable standard of appellate review as follows:

This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial court’s factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)). The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). See Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that appellate courts reviewing a distribution of marital property “ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”).

Murdock v. Murdock, No. W2019-00979-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 2, 2022).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has articulated the appellate standard of review for a trial court’s division of a marital estate as follows:

This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). . . . The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). In the more recent case of Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228 (Tenn. 2010), the Tennessee Supreme Court reasserted the deferential standard of review articulated in Keyt, to-wit:

After classifying the divorcing parties’ assets as either separate or marital, the trial court must divide the marital estate equitably by weighing the relevant factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4121(c). We give great weight to the trial court’s division of marital property and “‘are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.’” [Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 327] (quoting [Herrera, 944 S.W.2d at 389]).

…

Because trial courts have broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, the division of marital property is not a mechanical process. As this Court has explained:

The approach to dividing a marital estate should not be mechanical, but rather should entail carefully weighing the relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) in light of the evidence that the parties have presented. Flannary v. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d [647,] 650-51 [(Tenn. 2003)]; Tate v. Tate, 138 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d [220], 230 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)]. Trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning an equitable division of marital property, Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tenn. 2004); Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983), and appellate courts must accord great weight to a trial court’s division of marital property. Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)]. Accordingly, it is not our role to tweak the manner in which a trial court has divided the marital property. Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d [821], 834 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)]. Rather, our role is to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standards, whether the manner in which the trial court weighed the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) is consistent with logic and reason, and whether the trial court’s division of the marital property is equitable. [Jolly,] 130 S.W.3d at 785-86; Gratton v. Gratton, No. M2004-01964-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 794883, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed); [Kinard,] 986 S.W.2d at 231.

Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).