Trial-Related Issues (Including Motions in Limine)
Motion to Re-Open Proof After Evidence is Closed But Before Judgment is Entered
Except as indicated, all indented material is copied directly from the court’s opinion.
Decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court
Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 149-50 (Tenn. 1991).
[P]ermitting additional proof, after a party has announced that proof is closed, is within the discretion of the trial court, and unless it appears that its action in that regard has permitted injustice, its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal. It is within the discretion of the trial judge whether to reopen the proof for further evidence, and the decision of the trial judge thereon will not be set aside unless there is a showing that an injustice has been done.
. . . .
This rule, in our opinion, was adopted to promote the discretion of the trial judge in directing the course of a trial. The ascertainment of the truth and a just determination of the respective rights of the parties insofar as this can be accomplished consistent with rules essential to the administration of justice[] is the purpose of all judicial inquiry. . . . [T]he function of a judge of a law court is not limited to that of a mere referee or umpire between contestants in a game of skill. Upon the contrary, in many respects he has wide discretion to be exercised in the promotion of the purpose for which the trial is had. . . .
Decisions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals
Dunn v. Vucodinovich, No. E2021-00146-COA-R3-CV, p. 28 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023).
“Whether to re-open the proof to permit additional evidence after the proof has closed is within the discretion of the trial court.” Iloube v. Cain, 397 S.W.3d 597, 604 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tenn. 1991)). Unless it appears that the trial court’s decision “‘has permitted injustice, its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.’” Acosta v. Acosta, 499 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Simpson, 810 S.W.2d at 149). However, “‘[t]he mere fact that evidence adduced after reopening the case produced a different result is not determinative of trial court error, for the trial court is entitled to and should have the benefit of all available evidence for its assistance in arriving at a just determination.’” Id. (quoting McBay v. Cooper, No. 01A01- 9205-CV-00202, 1992 WL 205256, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1992)). In this context, “‘[t]he injustice which renders erroneous a reopening of proof is serious inconvenience to a party, the jury or the court, or the introduction of further evidence without a fair opportunity for rebuttal.’” Id. (quoting McBay, 1992 WL 205256, at *3).
