Construction / Interpretation of Statutes

Welch v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center LLC, No. W2020-00917-SC-R11-CV, p. 14-15 (Tenn. Aug. 31, 2023). 

This issue requires us to construe section 34-6-208(a). In doing so, we are mindful that “[t]he text of the statute is of primary importance, and the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)). We consider “the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment.” Spires v. Simpson, 539 S.W.3d 134, 143 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting State v. Collins, 166 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tenn. 2005)). Our construction must be reasonable in light of the statute’s purposes and objectives. Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 496 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn. 2001)).

Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division of TennCare, No. M2020-01358-SC-R11-CV, p. 6 (Tenn. May 25, 2023). 

Because these are questions of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tenn. 2022). “This Court’s role in statutory interpretation is ‘to determine what a statute means.’” Id. (quoting Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tenn. 2008)). We consider “how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued.” Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012)). We “give the words of a statute their ‘natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.’” Id. at 925 (quoting Ellithorpe v. Weismark, 479 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tenn. 2015)). And “[i]n the absence of statutory definitions, we look to authoritative dictionaries published around the time of a statute’s enactment.” Id.

State v. Brooks, No. W2018-02299-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2023). 

When construing statutory language, this Court is required to “ascertain and give effect to the intention or purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute.” In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 808 (Tenn. 2007) (citing State ex rel. Rector v. Wilkes, 222 Tenn. 384, 436 S.W.2d 425, 427 (1968)). Barring ambiguous language, we determine legislative intent “from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” Id. (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000)).

In re Conservatorship of Arkin, No. M2022-01808-COA-R3-CV, p. 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2023). 

“[I]ssues of statutory construction are questions of law.” Ki v. State, 78 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 791 (Tenn. 2000)). We review such issues de novo, “according no presumption of correctness to the conclusions reached by the trial court.” Id. (citations omitted).

When construing statutes, our primary objective “is to ascertain and give effect to the intention or purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute,” In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 808 (Tenn. 2007), “‘without unduly restricting or expanding’” the coverage of the statute beyond its intended scope. Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 828 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002)). To achieve this objective, we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the statute. Id. We must construe the words used “in the context in which they appear in the statute and in light of the statute’s general purpose.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010). If a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we “need not look beyond the statute itself to ascertain its meaning.” Id. at 527. When the language is ambiguous, we must review the statutory scheme in its entirety and consider additional extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent. Id. at 527; Sallee, 171 S.W.3d at 828. An ambiguity exists “when a statute is capable of conveying more than one meaning.” Najo Equip. Leasing, LLC v. Comm’r of Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). Statutory construction presents a question of law that we review de novo without a presumption of correctness. State v. Welch, 595 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tenn. 2020).

Sanders v. Higgins, No. M2022-00892-COA-R3-CV, p. 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2023). 

We review questions of law, including those of statutory interpretation, de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)); see also In re Estate of Haskins, 224 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). Our Supreme Court has summarized the principles involved in statutory construction:

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009).

This case also requires this Court to interpret statutes. Statutory construction presents a question of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Moreno, 479 S.W.3d at 802; Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tenn. 2007).

Cruise v. Byrd, No. M2022-01578-COA-R3-CV, p. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2023).

Solomon v. Solomon, No. M2021-00958-COA-R3-CV, p. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2023). 

Interpretation of procedural rules and statutes are questions of law, which we review de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011). We apply the same rules of interpretation to both rules and statutes. Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Tenn. 2009).

The issues presented by this appeal involve the proper interpretation of certain statutory provisions. Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewable on a de novo basis without any presumption of correctness. In re Est. of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 2009); Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000).

Vandyke v. Cheek, No. M2022-00938-COA-R10-CV, p. 2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2023). 

In interpreting statutes, the Tennessee Supreme Court has provided the following guidance:

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate legislative intent, with all rules of construction being aid[s] to that end. We examine the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment. We must seek a reasonable construction in light of the purposes, objectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.

Spires v. Simpson, 539 S.W.3d 134, 143 (Tenn. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The text of the statute is of primary importance, and the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has further explained that:

We consider the whole text of a statute and interpret each word “so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant.” Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 228 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn. 1975)). We also consider “[t]he overall statutory framework.” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 846 (Tenn. 2019). “[S]tatutes ‘in pari materia’—those relating to the same subject or having a common purpose—are to be construed together . . . .” Wilson v. Johnson Cnty., 879 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn. 1994).

We presume that a statute applies prospectively unless the legislature clearly provides for its retroactive application. State v. Thompson, 151 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tenn. 2004); Hannum v. Bank of Tenn., 41 Tenn. (1 Cold.) 398, 402 (1860) (“The very essence of a new law . . . is a rule for future cases.”).

When a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous after consideration of the statutory text, the broader statutory framework, and any relevant canons of statutory construction, we “enforce the statute as written.” Johnson, 432 S.W.3d at 848.

State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tenn. 2022).

Barrett v. Killings, No. M2022-00946-COA-R3-JV, p. 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 24, 2023). 

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law; thus, we engage in de novo review and accord the trial court’s interpretation no presumption of correctness. Regions Bank v. Thomas, 532 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tenn. 2017).

“Issues of statutory construction are questions of law and shall be reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness.” Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co., 27 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tenn. 2000). When construing statutes, this court bears in mind the following:

Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012) (citations omitted).

Pragnell v. Franklin, No. E2022-00524-COA-R3-CV, p. 8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 18, 2023). 

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009). “Moreover, when an issue on appeal requires statutory interpretation, we review the trial court’s decision de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 578 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).

In analyzing the application of § 34-3-105(d), we adhere to the following longstanding principles of statutory construction:

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009).

Statutory construction presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Pickard v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 424 S.W.3d 511, 518 (Tenn. 2013). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent.” Kite v. Kite, 22 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tenn. 1997). We give the words in a statute a “natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.” Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012). “When a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous after consideration of the statutory text, the broader statutory framework, and any relevant canons of statutory construction, we ‘enforce the statute as written.’” State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tenn. 2022) (quoting Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tenn. 2013)).

Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, p. 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023). 

The construction of a statute is a question of law. Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., 615 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tenn. 2021) (citations omitted). The application of a statute to the facts of a case also presents a question of law. Comm’ns of Powell-Clinch v. Util. Mgmt. Review Bd., 427 S.W.3d 375, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). We review questions of law de novo upon the record with no presumption of correctness for the determination of the trial court. Coffman, 615 S.W.3d at 893 (citations omitted).

The issue in this case also requires this Court’s construction of the TRLLCA, which is a question of law, and which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Krajenta v. Westphal, No. W2021-00832-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 4483412 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2022) (citing In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 2009)).

Accordingly, this is an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 494-95 (Tenn. 2017)).

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Singh, No. M2022-00134-COA-R3-CV, p. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2022). 

When interpreting statutes, the intention of the legislature is the paramount concern. In re Hogue, 286 S.W.3d 890, 894 (2009).

Reiss v. Rock Creek Construction, Inc., No. E2021-01513-COA-R3-CV, p. 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2022). 

Inasmuch as our analysis involves issues of statutory construction and interpretation, we will adhere to the following longstanding principles:

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009). “Moreover, when an issue on appeal requires statutory interpretation, we review the trial court’s decision de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 578 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).

Pagliara v. Moses, No. M2020-00990-COA-R3-CV, p. 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2022). 

The interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119 is a question of law. “We review questions of law, including those of statutory construction, de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Snyder v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., No. E2015-00530- COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 423806, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2016) (citing Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41, 43 (Tenn. 2013); Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn. 2012)). “When considering the interpretation of a statute, we must determine the General Assembly’s intent and purpose by reading the words of the statutes using their plain and ordinary meaning in the context in which the words appear.” Montpelier v. Moncier, No. E2018-00448-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 990529, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2019). “When a statute’s text is clear and unambiguous, the courts need not look beyond the statute itself to ascertain its meaning.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010). When construing a statute, a court tries “to give full effect to the General Assembly’s purpose, stopping just short of exceeding its intended scope.” Id. at 526 (citing Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tenn. 2010)). We seek to construe statutes “in a way that avoids conflict and facilitates harmonious operation of the law.” Id. at 527 (citations omitted).

Estate of Wallace v. Newrez LLC, No. W2021-00599-COA-R3-CV, p. 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2022). 

The issue presented by this appeal involves the interpretation and applicability of state statutes. The construction of a statute and the application of the statute to the facts of a case are questions of law. Comm’ns of Powell-Clinch v. Util. Mgmt. Review Bd., 427 S.W.3d 375, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). We review questions of law de novo upon the record with no presumption of correctness for the determination of the trial court. Id. (citation omitted).

Waggoner v. State, No. M2021-01037-COA-R3-CV, p. 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2022). 

The issues in this appeal present questions of law which we review de novo. See Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children and Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tenn. 2002) (“Our determination whether the Tennessee Public Records Act applies to the records in Cherokee’s possession is a question of law.”). The trial court’s conclusions are afforded no presumption of correctness. We must also resolve issues of statutory interpretation, which too are questions of law that we review de novo without a presumption of correctness. See id.; see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 578 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). 

The polestar of statutory interpretation is the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 578 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018); see also Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., 439 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tenn. 2014) (noting that the court’s goal in statutory construction is to “ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent” (citing Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004))). We begin by “reading the words of the statutes using their plain and ordinary meaning in the context in which the words appear.” Nationwide, 578 S.W.3d at 30. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we look no further than the language of the statute itself to determine its meaning. Id. We are compelled to apply the statute’s “‘plain meaning in its normal and accepted use.’” Griffin, 439 S.W.3d at 903 (quoting Eastman, 151 S.W.3d at 507). We do not read sections of a statute “in isolation,” however. Id. (citing Kradel v. Piper Indus., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Tenn. 2001)). Rather, we read a statute “as a whole . . . in conjunction with [its] surrounding parts, and view [it] consistently with the legislative purpose.” Id.

Wilson v. Wilson, No. M2021-01307-COA-R3-CV, p. 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2022). 

The trial court dismissed Mr. Wilson’s complaint against Ms. Wilson on the basis that it was an abusive civil action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107. Our review of that decision requires us to apply a statute to the facts, presenting a mixed question of law and fact, and is thus reviewed de novo, with no presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision. Lance v. York, 359 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). In this type of review, appellate courts have “‘great latitude to determine whether findings as to mixed questions of fact and law made by the trial court are sustained by probative evidence on appeal.’” Id. (quoting Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995)).

State v. HRC Medical Centers, Inc., No. M2021-00488-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2022).

The construction of statutes and the application of the law to the facts present questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tenn. 2005).