Administrative Proceedings

Review of Administrative Decisions Generally

Except as indicated, all indented material is copied directly from the court’s opinion.

Editor’s Note:  New legislation impacting the judicial review of actions of administrative agencies went into effect on April 14, 2022.  This legislation has not yet been construed by the appellate courts.  The legislation provides as follows: 

In interpreting a state statute or rule, a court presiding over the appeal of a judgment
in a contested case shall not defer to a state agency’s interpretation of the statute or rule and shall interpret the statute or rule de novo. After applying all customary tools of interpretation, the court shall resolve any remaining ambiguity against increased agency authority.

The legislation will be codified in Title 4, Chapter 5, Part 3.  No section number has been assigned by the Code Commission. 

Decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court

Decisions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals

American Business Supply, Inc. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, No. M2022-01411-COA-R3-CV, p. 7-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2023). 

The Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”), Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 4-5-101, et seq., governs judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision.8 Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1). Our review under the UAPA is the same as the trial court’s. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P. v. Tennessee Dep’t of Labor, 77 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The UAPA provides a standard of review that is “more narrowly circumscribed” than the standard generally applied in civil appeals. Moss v. Shelby Cnty. Civ. Serv. Merit Bd., 665 S.W. 433, 440 (Tenn. 2023) (citations omitted). Under the UAPA,

[t]he court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative

findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A)(i) Except as provided in subdivision (h)(5)(B), unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record;

(ii) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).9 Additionally,

[n]o agency decision pursuant to a hearing in a contested case shall be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court unless for errors that affect the merits of such decision.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(i).10 This well-settled standard of review ““reflects the general principle that courts should defer to decisions of administrative agencies when they are acting within their area of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.”” Moss, 665 S.W.3d at 441 (quoting StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Tenn. Env’t Council, Inc. v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 254 S.W.3d 396, 401-402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Wayne Cnty. v. Tenn. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); CF Indus. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 599 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tenn. 1980); Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tenn. 1977))).

As the Tennessee Supreme Court recently reiterated:

“A decision of an administrative agency is arbitrary or capricious when there is no substantial and material evidence supporting the decision.” StarLink Logistics, 494 S.W.3d at 669 (citing Pittman v. City of Memphis, 360 S.W.3d 382, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Jackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)); see also Watts v. Civ. Serv. Bd. for Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980) (“Whether or not there is any material evidence to support the action of the agency is a question of law to be decided by the reviewing court upon an examination of the evidence introduced before the agency.”). “[S]ubstantial and material evidence” is “less than a preponderance of the evidence and more than a ‘scintilla or glimmer’ of evidence.” StarLink Logistics, 494 S.W.3d at 669 (citation omitted) (quoting Wayne Cnty., 756 S.W.2d at 280). “A decision with evidentiary support can be arbitrary or capricious if it amounts to a clear error in judgment,” id. at 669 (citing City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of Memphis, 216 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tenn. 2007)), and “is not based on any course of reasoning or exercise of judgment, or … disregards the facts or circumstances of the case without some basis that would lead a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion[.]” Id. at 669– 70 (alteration in original) (quoting Civ. Serv. Comm’n of Memphis, 216 S.W.3d at 316).

Id. However,

[i]f there is room for two opinions, a decision is not arbitrary or capricious if it is made honestly and upon due consideration, even though [a reviewing court] think[s] a different conclusion might have been reached. The “arbitrary or capricious” standard is a limited scope of review, and a court will not overturn a decision of an agency acting within its area of expertise and within the exercise of its judgment solely because the court disagrees with an agency’s ultimate conclusion.

Id. (quoting StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 670 (Tenn. 2016) (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 103 Wash. App. 587, 13 P.3d 1076, 1083 (2000))).

Waste Management Inc. of Tennessee v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County by and through Davidson County Solid Waste Region Board, No. M2022-00531-COA-R3-CV, p. 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023). 

Judicial review of the decision of the Region Board, both in the trial and appellate courts, is performed under the narrow standard of review outlined in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-211-814(b)(2)(D); see also StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 668 (Tenn. 2016) (recognizing that under the UAPA, appellate review of an agency decision is both “narrow and deferential”). The UAPA limits reversal or modification of an agency’s decision to situations where the decision is:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A)(i) . . . [U]nsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record;

(ii) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).

The UAPA standard of review is narrower than what is generally applied in other appeals because it “reflects the general principle that courts should defer to decisions of administrative agencies when they are acting within their area of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.” StarLink Logistics Inc., 494 S.W.3d at 669; see also Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tenn. 1977) (describing review under the UAPA as “confined to a narrow and statutorily prescribed review of the record made before the administrative agency”). Reviewing courts do not second-guess the agency regarding the weight of the evidence, even where the evidence could support a different outcome. Id. Rather, we review an agency’s factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial and material evidence in the record. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5); see also Macon v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t Civ. Serv. Merit Bd., 309 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).

City of Memphis v. Pension Board of the City of Memphis, No. W2022-01065-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2023). 

“Unlike the ‘broad standard of review used in other civil appeals,’ the UAPA provides a more narrowly circumscribed standard.” Moss v. Shelby Cnty. Civil Serv. Merit Bd., 665 S.W.3d 433, 440 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Davis v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 278 S.W.3d 256, 263–64 (Tenn. 2009))). Reviewing courts may only reverse, remand, or modify civil service merit board decisions “for errors that affect the merits of such decision.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(i). “[A]s opposed to the broader standard of review applied in other appeals,” the UAPA’s standard of review “reflects the general principle that courts should defer to decisions of administrative agencies when they are acting within their area of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.” StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tenn. 2016) (citations omitted).

Under that standard of review:

The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.

(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Moss, 665 S.W.3d at 440 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)).

“A decision of an administrative agency is arbitrary or capricious when there is no substantial and material evidence supporting the decision.” StarLink Logistics, 494 S.W.3d at 669 (citations omitted). “A decision with evidentiary support can be arbitrary or capricious if it amounts to a clear error in judgment.” StarLink Logistics, 494 S.W.3d at 669 (citing City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of Memphis, 216 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tenn. 2007)), and “is not based on any course of reasoning or exercise of judgment, or . . . disregards the facts or circumstances of the case without some basis that would lead a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion.” Id. at 669–70 (alteration in original) (quoting Civ. Serv. Comm’n of Memphis, 216 S.W.3d at 316).

The interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law, and courts must review the interpretation of ordinances pursuant to the de novo standard. See Northshore Corridor Ass’n v. Knox Cnty., 633 S.W.3d 561, 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021); City of Cleveland v. Wade, 206 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“The interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law.”). Moreover, “[t]he rules of statutory interpretation are used when interpreting an ordinance.” Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted). “Construction of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo, with no presumption of correctness.” Id. (quoting Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)).

Jackson v. City of Memphis, No. W2022-00362-COA-R3-CV, p. 9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2023). 

When reviewing a civil service board’s decision upholding the termination of a civil service employee, courts apply the standards for judicial review set forth in the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“the UAPA”). Moss v. Shelby Cnty. Civ. Serv. Merit Bd., 597 S.W.3d 823, 830 (Tenn. 2020). Specifically, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(h) of the UAPA “contains the standard of judicial review that is used to review decisions of the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission.” Davis v. City of Memphis, No. W2016-00967- COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 634780, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2017) (citing City of Memphis v. Lesley, No. W2012-01962-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5532732, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2013)). It provides that:

(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.

(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).6 “The reviewing court may reverse, remand, or modify a civil service board decision only for errors that affect the merits of the decision.” Moss, 597 S.W.3d at 830 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(i)).

Sevier County, Tenn. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, No. E2022-00773-COA-R3-CV, p. 5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2023). 

Judicial review of decisions by administrative agencies following contested case hearings is generally governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1). The UAPA restricts the scope of the review to the record, with limited exception. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(g) (“The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.”). However, a growing body of case law has clarified that the review applicable in real estate tax classification matters decided by the State Board of Equalization permits “a new hearing in the chancery court based upon the administrative record and any additional or supplemental evidence which either party wishes to adduce relevant to any issue.” Tenn. Code Annotated § 67-5-1511(b) (emphasis added); see generally Cress v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, No. E2021-00093-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 5148088, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2021) (providing that a court may consider additional evidence, along with the administrative record, in its review of a State Board of Equalization decision).

Regardless of whether new evidence is adduced at the hearing, the reviewing court must then make its determination within the parameters of Section 4-5-322(h) of the UAPA, which provides as follows:

The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

        1. (1)  In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
        2. (2)  In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
        3. (3)  Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A)(i) . . . unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record[.]

Each ground for reversal or modification carries its own independent standard of review that will be discussed further in our analysis as applicable.

Taylor v. Board of Administration, City of Memphis Retirement System, No. W2022-00896-COA-R3-CV, p. 8-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2023). 

We review the ALJ’s decision under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101, et seq.; see Marino v. Bd. of Admin. City of Memphis Ret. Sys., No. W2015-00283-COA-R9-CV, 2015 WL 7169796, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015), no appl. perm. appeal filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 provided:

(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.
(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).3

The term “substantial and material evidence” has been defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under consideration.’” Papachristou v. Univ. of Tennessee, 29 S.W.3d 487, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Clay Co. Manor, Inc. v. State, 849 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tenn. 1993)). This Court has also described it as requiring “‘something less than a preponderance of the evidence … but more than a scintilla or glimmer.’” Gluck v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 15 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Wayne Co. v. State Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)). Judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision under the “substantial and material evidence” standard, however, subjects the agency’s decision to close scrutiny. Sanifill of Tennessee, Inc. v. State Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 907 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1995).

When reviewing a trial court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, this Court essentially is to determine “whether or not the trial court properly applied the … standard of review” found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). Papachristou, 29 S.W.3d at 490 (citations omitted). This Court addressed its judicial review of evidence contained in the administrative record as follows: “While this Court may consider evidence in the record that detracts from its weight, [this] [C]ourt is not allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the weight of the evidence….” Gluck, 15 S.W.3d at 490 (citations omitted); see also McClellan v. Bd. of Regents of State Univ., 921 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that this Court “is not at liberty to reevaluate the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder”) (citation omitted). In short, the applicable standard is quite limited. However, courts reviewing administrative decisions are not utterly passive in their deference. Our Supreme Court has discussed:

In Jackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals confirmed the limited nature of review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. That court observed that only those agency decisions not supported by substantial and material evidence qualified as arbitrary and capricious but determined that even those decisions with adequate evidentiary support might still be arbitrary and capricious if caused by a clear error in judgment. Id. at 110. Our Court of Appeals warned against a mechanical application of the standard of review under subsections (4) or (5):

In its broadest sense, the standard requires the court to determine whether the administrative agency has made a clear error in judgment. An arbitrary [or capricious] decision is one that is not based on any course of reasoning or exercise of judgment, or one that disregards the facts or circumstances of the case without some basis that would lead a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion.

Likewise, a reviewing court should not apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-[5]-322(h)(5)’s “substantial and material evidence” test mechanically. Instead, the court should review the record carefully to determine whether the administrative agency’s decision is supported by “such relevant evidence as a rational mind might accept to support a rational conclusion.” … The evidence will be sufficient if it furnishes a reasonably sound factual basis for the decision being reviewed.

Id. at 110-111 (citations omitted).

By virtue of these guidelines, our review is confined to whether the decision of the Commission qualifies as either arbitrary or capricious or, in the alternative, has insufficient support in the evidence. While the Chancellor, in this instance, appropriately recognized the principle that an administrative decision should not be disturbed when there is substantial or material evidence to support one of two results, it is our conclusion that even under a limited scope of review, these facts warrant a result contrary to that of the Commission. See Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that rejection of an administrative agency’s factual findings is appropriate “if a reasonable person would necessarily draw a different conclusion from the record”).

City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 216 S.W.3d 311, 316-17 (Tenn. 2007). In addition, regarding a board’s responsibility to ultimately make the decision on whether to award a pension based upon the medical evidence before it, this Court has stated:

As to petitioner’s contention that the last sentence of section 25-1(27) dictates that both the diagnosis and the award of a line-of-duty disability should be left solely to the discretion of the two examining physicians, we find this contention to be without merit. It is the responsibility of the board to make the decision whether to award a pension based upon the medical evidence presented.

Splain v. City of Memphis, No. 02A01-9511-CH-00259, 1996 WL 383297, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 1996), no appl. perm. appeal filed.

Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board, No. W2017-01813-SC-R11-CV, p. 8-10 (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2023). 

When reviewing the decision of a civil service merit board “affect[ing] the employment status of a county or city civil service employee,” courts apply the standard of review outlined in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2013); Davis v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 278 S.W.3d 256, 263–64 (Tenn. 2009). Unlike the “broad standard of review used in other civil appeals,” the UAPA provides a more narrowly circumscribed standard. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 263– 64). Under that standard of review:

The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

        1. (1)  In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
        2. (2)  In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
        3. (3)  Made upon unlawful procedure;
        4. (4)  Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.

(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) (2011).

Reviewing courts may only reverse, remand, or modify civil service merit board decisions “for errors that affect the merits of such decision.” Id. § -322(i). “[A]s opposed to the broader standard of review applied in other appeals,” the UAPA’s standard of review “reflects the general principle that courts should defer to decisions of administrative agencies when they are acting within their area of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.” StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Tenn. Env’t Council, Inc. v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 254 S.W.3d 396, 401–02 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Wayne Cnty. v. Tenn. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); CF Indus. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 599 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tenn. 1980); Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tenn. 1977)).

 

Copeland v. Tennessee Department of Correction, No. M2021-01557-COA-R3-CV, p. 5-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2022).

“Under the TEAM Act, Board of Appeals’ decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”).” Pressley, 528 S.W.3d at 512. The TEAM Act “provides a streamlined, three-step appeal process for preferred service employees seeking to challenge a dismissal decision.” Vaulx v. Tenn. Dep’t of Transp., No. M2020-00193-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 2156919, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2021). This Court has explained the appeals process under the TEAM Act, elucidating:

A preferred service employee may initiate a Step I appeal by filing a written complaint with the Commissioner of the employing agency. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-318(h)(1)(A). The Commissioner or his designee investigates the complaint and shares all relevant information with the employee. Id. After personally meeting with the employee, the Commissioner issues a written decision. Id.

Dissatisfied employees may request a Step II review by the Commissioner of Human Resources. Id. § 8-30-318(h)(1)(B)(i). The employee must provide a written argument “setting out why the employee believes the Step I decision was in error and ought to be overturned, reduced, or amended.” Id. § 8-30-318(h)(1)(B)(ii). The Commissioner reviews the complaint and the Step I decision and determines whether additional investigation is necessary. Id. § 8-30-318(h)(1)(B)(i). Again, the employee is entitled to review all documents and evidence considered by the Commissioner. Id. After reviewing all the relevant evidence, the Commissioner must provide the employee and the state agency with a written decision. Id.

Either party may initiate a Step III appeal to the Board of Appeals. Id. § 8-30-318(h)(1)(C). A Step III review includes a formal hearing before three members of the Board of Appeals. Id. § 8-30-318(h)(2). At the outset, an ALJ [Administrative Law Judge] reviews the file to “determine whether all previous procedural requirements were completed properly and in a timely manner.” Id. § 8-30-318(h)(1)(C). If not, the ALJ must dismiss the appeal. Id.

Step III hearings are conducted in accordance with the UAPA, as modified by the TEAM Act. Id. An ALJ is present during the hearing to assist the Board. Id. § 8-30-318(h)(2). The ALJ ensures that the proceedings comply with the applicable law. Id. The ALJ also makes evidentiary decisions, swears witnesses, and advises the Board on the applicable law. Id. The ALJ may also decide questions of procedure. Id. But the Board decides all factual issues and makes the ultimate decision. Id. No petitions for reconsideration are allowed. Id. § 8-30-318(i)(7).

Id. at *2.

With respect to the standard of review for Board decisions, our High Court in Pressley explained:

[T]his Court, as well as the trial and intermediate appellate courts, reviews the Board’s decision under the narrowly defined standard of review contained in the UAPA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) (2015 & Supp. 2016), rather than under the broad standard of review used in other civil appeals, Davis v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 278 S.W.3d 256, 263-64 (Tenn. 2009). Accordingly, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(h):

The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

        1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
        2. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
        3. Made upon unlawful procedure;
        4. Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
        5. (A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. (B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).[5] Applying this standard of review, a reviewing court may reverse the Board’s decision only if one or more of the five enumerated grounds for reversal are present. Id.; Davis, 278 S.W.3d at 264.

Pressley, 528 S.W.3d at 512. Moreover, “[n]o agency decision pursuant to a hearing in a contested case shall be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court unless for errors that affect the merits of such decision.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(i) (2022).

 

Durham v. Tennessee Registry of Election Finance, No. M2021-01455-COA-R3-CV, p. 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2022).

The matter now before us falls under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-101 et seq. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, “[a] person who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter, which shall be the only available method of judicial review.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1). The reviewing court “may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). The court may also reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. (B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h).5 Such a review is confined to the record. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(g). However, “[i]n cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 322(g). The standard of review remains the same for both the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeals. Yokley v. State Bd. of Educ., 305 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). The narrow standard of review applicable in these cases “reflects the general principle that courts should defer to decisions of administrative agencies when they are acting within their area of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.” StarLink Logistics Inc. v. ACC, LLC, 494 S.W.3d 649, 669 (Tenn. 2016). It is not the job of this Court to substitute its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence as it pertains to questions of fact. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(A).

 

Davis v. Tennessee Board of Appeals, No. M2020-01255-COA-R3-CV, p. 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2022).

The Board’s decision is “subject to judicial review in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-318(j). Trial and appellate courts use the same standard of review. Pressley, 528 S.W.3d at 512. We will only reverse or modify the Board’s decision

if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5) (A) . . . [U]nsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) (2021); Pressley, 528 S.W.3d at 512. “In determining the substantiality of the evidence, [we] take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,” but we do “not substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(A)(ii).

The substantial and material evidence standard “requires something less than a preponderance of the evidence, but more than a scintilla or glimmer.” Wayne Cnty. v. Tenn. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). The standard does not justify reversal simply because the evidence could support another result. Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Instead the decision should be upheld so long as the administrative record “furnishes a reasonably sound factual basis for the decision being reviewed.” City of Memphis v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 216 S.W.3d 311, 317 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Jackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W.2d 106, 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

 

Tennessee Dep’t. of Safety and Homeland Security v. Shell, p. 4 No. M2021-00108-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2022).

The parties agree that this case is governed by the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). See Nicholas v. Tennessee Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., No. M2017-01674-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3831518, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018) (citing McEwen v. Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)) (“Our review of civil forfeiture proceedings is primarily governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322.”). Section 4-5-322(h) provides a narrow standard of review that allows this Court to reverse or modify the decision of the agency only in specified circumstances, including that the decision was “[i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions” or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). Although section 4-5-322(h) applies a substantial and material evidence standard to factual findings, we review factual findings in forfeiture cases under the preponderance of evidence standard. McEwen, 173 S.W.3d at 819 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-213(a) (“The reviewing court shall use the preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency.”)).

City of Memphis v. Prye, No. W2020-01716-COA-R3-CV, p. 9-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2022).

“When reviewing administrative decisions, trial courts and appellate courts use the same standard of review.” A-1 Waste, LLC v. Madison Cnty. Mun. Solid Waste Planning Region Bd., No. M2013-02265-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 4594160, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2015) (citing Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249, 275-76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)) (citations omitted). “Courts defer to the decisions of administrative agencies when they are acting within their area of specialized knowledge, experience, and expertise.” Id. (quoting Wayne Cnty. v. Tenn. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)). “[W]e are not permitted to weigh factual evidence and substitute our own conclusions and judgment for that of the agency, even if the evidence could support a different determination than the agency reached.” Ware v. Greene, 984 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h); Humana of Tenn. v. Tenn. Health Facilities Comm’n, 551 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tenn. 1977). “We may reject the [Commission’s] decision only if a reasonable person would necessarily reach a different conclusion based on the evidence.” Davis v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 278 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Martin, 78 S.W.3d at 276)).

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-114, “[j]udicial review of decisions by civil service boards of a county or municipality which affects the employment status of a county or city civil service employee shall be in conformity with the judicial review standards” provided by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114(b)(1). The UAPA provides in part that “[t]he review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(g). Subsection (h) provides the scope of judicial review as follows, in relevant part:

(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A)(i) Except as provided in subdivision (h)(5)(B), unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record; (ii) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). “When reviewing a trial court’s examination of an administrative agency’s decision, the appellate court must determine ‘whether or not the trial court properly applied the . . . standard of review’ found at Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322(h).” Wade v. Tenn. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin., 487 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Bureau of TennCare, 94 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)) (citation omitted). Furthermore, subsection (i) provides that “[n]o agency decision pursuant to a hearing in a contested case shall be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court unless for errors that affect the merits of such decision.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(i).

As the City properly states in its appellate brief, this Court and the chancery court have “the sole duty to determine whether there was material evidence to support the [Commission’s] action . . . .” Austin v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, Reg’s. Off., 761 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

 

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. v. Davidson County Election Commission, No. M2021-00723-COA-R3-CV p. 7  (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2022).

The present appeal concerns the trial court’s review of the Commission’s action under the common law writ of certiorari. The standard governing such review is well settled law:

Upon review, the court may reverse or modify the decision of an administrative body or tribunal only upon determining that the action 1) violated a statutory or constitutional provision; 2) was made in excess of the agency’s authority; 3) was based on unlawful procedure; 4) was arbitrary or capricious; or 5) was not supported by material evidence.

Dill v. City of Clarksville, 511 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). Whether a board or tribunal acted illegally is a question of law, and with respect to appellate oversight, “[o]ur standard of review is the same as that of the trial court.” Id.

 

IN RE TWT ACQUISITION, LLC. PROPERTY ID: 003 009.04 TAX YEARS 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, No. M2020-01100-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2022).

The Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) governs judicial review of the  decisions  of  the  State  Board  of  Equalization.1   Coal  Creek  Co.  v.  Anderson  Cty., 546 S.W.3d 87, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017);  Willamette Indus., Inc. v. Tenn. Assessment Appeals Comm’n,  11  S.W.3d  142,  147  (Tenn.  Ct.  App.  1999).   While  the  scope  of  admissible evidence  at  the  trial  court  level  is  broader  when  reviewing  a  decision  of  the State  Board, the  standard  of  review  remains  the  same.    See Tenn.  Code  Ann.  § 67-5-1511(b) (2018); Schering-Plough  Healthcare  Prods.,  Inc.  v.  State  Bd.  of  Equalization,  999  S.W.2d  773, 776  n.5  (Tenn.  1999);  Spring  Hill,  L.P.  v.  Tenn.  State  Bd.  of  Equalization,  No.  M200102683-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23099679, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).   A  court may reverse or modify the State Board’s decision only

if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A)(i)  [U]nsupported  by  evidence  that  is  both  substantial  and  material  in light of the entire record; (ii)  In  determining  the  substantiality  of  evidence,  the  court  shall  take  into account  whatever  in  the  record  fairly  detracts  from  its  weight,  but  the  court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) (2021).

Relying  on  Tennessee  Code  Annotated  § 5-2-115(d),  Houston  County  maintains that the State Board’s decision violated state law.   See id. § 4-5-322(h)(1).  Both the State Board  and  the  trial  court  ruled  that  the  cited  statute  did  not  apply  to  personal  property.  Statutory construction  is a  question of law, which we review de novo.  See  Pickard v. Tenn. Water  Quality  Control  Bd.,  424  S.W.3d  511,  523 (Tenn.  2013);  Jones  v.  Bureau  of TennCare, 94 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

No  additional  evidence  was  introduced  at  the  trial  court  level.   So  our  review  is limited to the  administrative  record.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1511(b).  We review the agency’s findings of fact under the substantial and material evidence standard.   Willamette Indus.,  Inc.,  11  S.W.3d  at  147.    Substantial  and  material  evidence  is  “such  relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish  a  reasonably  sound  basis  for  the  action  under  consideration.”    S. Ry.  Co.  v.  State Bd.  of  Equalization, 682  S.W.2d  196,  199  (Tenn.  1984) (citation  omitted).   This  standard “requires something less than a preponderance of the evidence, but more than a scintilla or glimmer.”    Wayne  Cty.  v.  Tenn.  Solid  Waste  Disposal  Control  Bd., 756 S.W.2d  274,  280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).

Frazier v. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, No. M2020-00368-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2022).

When reviewing administrative decisions, trial courts and appellate courts use the same standard of review. See, e.g., Humana of Tenn. v. Tenn. Health Facilities Comm’n, 551 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tenn. 1977); Miller v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 271 S.W.3d 659, 664 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). The scope of our review is set by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.

The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5) (A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in light of the entire record. (B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) (2015).

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