Child Custody / Parenting Plan / Material Change in Circumstances

Except as indicated, all indented material is copied directly from the court’s opinion. 

Decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court

Opinions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals

State v. Baggett, No. M2022-01658-COA-R3-CV, p. 4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2023).

Hasley v. Lott, No. M2022-01141-COA-R3-JV, p. 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2023).

Taylor v. Taylor, No. M2022-00140-COA-R3-CV, p. 2-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2023).

In re McKayla H., No. W2020-01528-COA-R3-JV, p. 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 6, 2023).

Creger v. Creger, No. M2022-00558-COA-R3-CV, p. 8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2023).

This Court reviews a trial court’s determination of an appropriate parenting plan according to an abuse of discretion standard. See Morelock v. Morelock, No. E2016- 00543-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 3575890, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2017) (quoting Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014)). “[C]ustody and visitation arrangements are among the most important decisions confronting a trial court in a divorce case. The needs of the children are paramount; while the desires of the parents are secondary.” Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Waddell v. Waddell, No. W2020-00220-COA-R3-CV, p. 35-36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2023).

Furthermore, “trial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody.’” Schaeffer v. Patterson, No. W2018-02097-COA-R3-JV, 2019 WL 6824903, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2019) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Appellate courts will not interfere with a trial court’s custody determination absent an abuse of discretion. Dungey v. Dungey, No. M2020-00277-COA- R3-CV, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2020) (quoting C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017)). However, “[w]hile ‘the details of child custody and visitation arrangements are generally left to the discretion of the trial court . . . this discretion is not unbounded.’” K.B.J. v. T.J., 359 S.W.3d 608, 615-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting D v. K, 917 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).

Macomber v. Macomber, No. M2021-01503-COA-R3-CV, p. 3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2023).

“A trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan serves a child’s best interests are factual questions.” Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 684, 692 (Tenn. 2013) (citing In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). Therefore, “appellate courts must presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings.” Id.; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Likewise, trial courts have “broad discretion in formulating parenting plans” because they “are in a better position to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility.” C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693). On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision regarding parenting schedules for an abuse of discretion. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (citing Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standard to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88. We review questions of law de novo, affording the trial court’s decision no presumption of correctness. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692 (citing Mills v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn. 2012)).

“Because child support decisions retain an element of discretion, we review them using the deferential ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.” Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Bean v. Bean, No.M2022-00394-COA-R3-CV, p. 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2022).

In any proceeding “where the custody of a minor child … is a question,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(1), trial courts are to make custody determinations “on the basis of the best interest of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). Whether a parenting plan serves the child’s best interest is a finding of fact, subject upon appeal to de novo review with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates against the findings. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2013). However, the ability to observe witnesses firsthand and make credibility determinations puts the trial court in a better position to make the fact-driven decisions regarding parenting arrangements than an appellate court. Id. at 693; see also Gillum v. McDonald, No. M2003-00265-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1950730, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2004) (“Subtle factors may also be determinative, including the demeanor and credibility exhibited by the parents during the divorce proceeding.”). “Thus, determining the details of parenting plans is ‘peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.’ ” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (quoting Sullies v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988)). As such,

“It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court … appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88.

Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693.

In re Aiden W.L., No. W2021-01187-COA-R3-JV, p. 11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2022).

We are “‘mindful that trial courts are vested with wide discretion in matters of child custody.’” Schaeffer v. Patterson, No. W2018-02097-COA-R3-JV, 2019 WL 6824903, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2019) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Appellate courts will not interfere with a trial court’s custody determination absent an abuse of discretion. Dungey v. Dungey, No. M2020-00277-COA- R3-CV, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2020) (quoting C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017)). This Court may reverse a custody decision “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence.” Dungey, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2 (quoting C.W.H., 538 S.W.3d at 495). “This Court’s ‘paramount concern’ is the well-being and best interests of the child . . . .” Schaeffer, 2019 WL 6824903, at *4 (citing Johnson, 165 S.W.3d at 645). In C.W.H., the Tennessee Supreme Court “emphasized the limited scope of review to be employed by an appellate court in reviewing a trial court’s factual determinations in matters involving child custody . . . .” C.W.H., 538 S.W.3d at 495 (citing Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692- 93 (Tenn. 2013)). Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13, “appellate courts must presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings.” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (citations omitted).

L.A.S. v. C.W.H., No. E2021-00504-COA-R3-JV, p. 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2022).

This appeal involves modification of an existing permanent parenting plan. In C.W.H., our Supreme Court reiterated “the limited scope of review to be employed by an appellate court in reviewing a trial court’s factual determinations in matters involving child custody and parenting plan developments.” 538 S.W.3d at 495 (citing Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692–93 (Tenn. 2013)). A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed “de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Id. Whether a material change in circumstances has occurred is a question of fact, as is whether a parenting plan is in the best interests of a child. Id. Accordingly, we “presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and [will] not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings.” Id.

The juvenile court’s decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court “applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Id. (citing State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn. 2008)). A trial court abuses its discretion only when the ruling “falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Id. (quoting Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693); see also Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (quotation omitted) (“[T]he details of custody and visitation with children are peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.”). Under this stringent standard of review, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, and the ruling “will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 85 (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000)).

Finally, credibility determinations are of the utmost importance in cases involving custody and residential parenting schedules. See Kelly, 445 S.W.3d at 692; see also Higdon v. Higdon, No. M2019-02281-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 6336151, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2020) (explaining that issues rested “upon a he said/she said dichotomy which, in turn, hinges upon an assessment of witness credibility”). As these cases are “factually driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, trial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges.” Kelly, 445 S.W.3d at 692 (citing Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693). A lower court’s credibility determinations will not be re-evaluated “ ‘absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.’ ” Id. (quoting Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)).

Mangum v. Mangum, No. E2021-00285-COA-R3-CV, p. 16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2022).

Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, Holloway v. Bradley, 190 Tenn. 565, 230 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1950); Brumit v. Brumit, 948 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), trial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges. Massey– Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.’ ” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)). “It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001).

Taylor v. Taylor, No. E2021-01281-COA-R3-CV, p. 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2022).

This is an appeal from a bench trial. Accordingly, we review the trial court’s factual findings de novo, presuming those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Kaplan v. Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)). “In order for the evidence to preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, the evidence must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect.” Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Kaplan, 188 S.W.3d at 635.

Sines v. Tinnin, No. E2021-01434-COA-R3-CV, p. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2022).

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record, with a presumption of correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). This presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact and not to conclusions of law. Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996). The trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court’s determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011).

Trial courts have “broad discretion in formulating parenting plans” because they “are in a better position to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility.” C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tenn. 2013)). “A trial court’s broad discretion on custody matters extends to the question of which parent should be named primary residential parent.” Grissom v. Grissom, 586 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019). On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule for an abuse of discretion. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (citing Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). “A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule ‘only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.’” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (quoting Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88).

In re B.C., No. W2021-00910-COA-R3-JV, p. 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2022).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has “emphasized the limited scope of review to be employed by an appellate court in reviewing a trial court’s factual determinations in matters involving child custody and parenting plan developments.” C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2013) (stating that the appropriate standard of “review of the trial court’s factual findings is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise”)). The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that

[a] trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan serves a child’s best interests are factual questions. Thus, appellate courts must presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings.

Id. (quoting Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692 (citations omitted)). “Similarly, appellate courts will not interfere with a trial court’s custody determination or decision concerning a parenting schedule absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Jonathan S., No. M2021-00370- COA-R3-JV, 2022 WL 3695066, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2022); see C.W.H., 538 S.W.3d at 495; Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001); Dungey v. Dungey, No. M2020-00277-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2020). “‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.’” Id. (quoting C.W.H., 538 S.W.3d at 495). Therefore, we will set aside a trial court’s decision concerning custody or a parenting plan “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence.” Id. (quoting Dungey, 2020 WL 5666906, at *2).

Camacho v. Camacho, No. M2021-00994-COA-R3-CV, p. 3-4 (Tenn. Ct App. Oct. 7, 2022).

While a trial court’s determination of whether a parenting plan serves a child’s best interest is a finding of fact, Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013), “determining the details of parenting plans is ‘peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.’” Id. at 693 (quoting Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988)). As a result,

“It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88.

Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693.

Grace v. Grace, No. M2021-00116-COA-R3-CV, p. 10-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2022).

“Whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and whether a modification of a parenting plan serves a child’s best interest are factual questions.” Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692–93 (Tenn. 2013) (citing In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). Thus, we presume that the trial court’s findings are correct unless the evidence preponderates against them. Id.; see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). For evidence to preponderate against a trial court’s finding, it must support another finding with greater convincing effect. Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Realty Shop, Inc. v. RR Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)).

Emch v. Emch, No. M2021-00139-COA-R3-CV, p. 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2022).

“A trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan serves a child’s best interests are factual questions.” Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013). Thus, we “must presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings.” Id. at 693.

Determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge,” and we will not reverse such decisions absent an abuse of that discretion. Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014). Likewise, “the decision to grant attorney’s fees under section 36-5-103(c) is largely within the discretion of the trial court and . . . , absent an abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court’s finding.” Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tenn. 2017).

The abuse of discretion standard does not permit reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for the trial court. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). That said, the abuse of discretion standard of review does not immunize a lower court’s decision from meaningful appellate scrutiny:

Discretionary decisions must take the applicable law and the relevant facts into account. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays beyond the applicable legal standards or when it fails to properly consider the factors customarily used to guide the particular discretionary decision. A court abuses its discretion when it causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.

Id. (citations omitted). In other words, discretionary decisions require “a conscientious judgment, consistent with the facts, that takes into account the applicable law.” White v. Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 524).

On the other hand, courts have “no discretion whether to award attorney’s fees when the parties have a valid and enforceable marital dissolution agreement which requires an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing or successful party.” Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d at 478. “When such a MDA exists, it is subject to the normal rules of contractual interpretation and enforcement.” Id. “If the MDA is determined to be a valid and enforceable agreement, the terms of the parties’ agreement govern the award of fees, and the court must enforce the parties’ terms to the extent the agreement demands.” Id. “The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law that requires a de novo review on appeal.” Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Carver, 415 S.W.3d 808, 815 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999)).

In re: Jonathan S., No. M2021-00370-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2022).

We review a non-jury case “de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness as to the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and “are accorded no presumption of correctness.” Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tenn. 2008).

Friedsam v. Krisle, No. M2021-00530-COA-R3-CV, p. 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2022).

“While a trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a parenting plan, the touchstone is the best interest of the child.” Smallbone v. Smallbone, No. M2020-01556- COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 1405655, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2022) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (2017); Maupin v. Maupin, 420 S.W.3d 761, 770 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)). While a trial court’s determination of whether a parenting plan serves a child’s best interest is a finding of fact, Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013), “determining the details of parenting plans is ‘peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.’” Id. at 693 (quoting Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988)). As a result,

“It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88.

Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693.

Jones v. Jones, No. M2021-00788-COA-R3-CV, p. 9-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2022).

Under both the federal and state constitutions, a parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her own child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 249-50 (Tenn. 2010); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 1994)). “Persons who are not a child’s biological parent, however, do not have the same constitutionally protected interests as are possessed by a biological parent.” Bryan v. Miller, No. M2015-00550- COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4249291, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2016) (citing Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). This Court has determined that, generally speaking, “when faced with competing custody claims by a biological parent and a third party, the courts must favor the biological parent.” Ray, 83 S.W.3d at 732.

In In re Askew, our Supreme Court, considered the legal standard to apply in custody disputes between parents and non-parents and held:

a parent cannot be deprived of the custody of a child unless there has been a finding, after notice required by due process, of substantial harm to the child. Only then may a court engage in a general “best interest of the child” evaluation in making a determination of custody.

In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tenn. 1995)). Similarly, in Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 148 (Tenn. 2002) (superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2013)), our Supreme Court recognized that in light of parents’ fundamental right “to have the care and custody of their children[,]” courts that are “deciding initial custody disputes” must give parents “a presumption of ‘superior parental rights’ regarding the custody of their children.” Blair, 77 S.W.3d at 141 (citing In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d at 4). Thus, in an initial custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent, “the non-parent has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be exposed to substantial harm if placed in the custody of the parent.” In re R.D.H., No. M2006-00837-COA-R3JV, 2007 WL 2403352, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007) (citing Ray, 83 S.W.3d at 732-33)). If the court makes a finding of substantial harm, then it may “engage in a general ‘best interest of the child’ evaluation in making a determination of custody.” In re Adoption Female Child, 896 S.W.2d at 548.

A different analysis may apply, however, when a parent seeks to modify an existing custody order that vests custody with a non-parent. In re R.D.H., 2007 WL 2403352, at *7. In particular, the Blair Court determined that “a parent who is given the opportunity to rely upon the presumption of superior rights in an initial custody determination may not again invoke that doctrine to modify a valid custody order.” Blair, 77 S.W.3d at 148. Instead, when a parent has already been given an opportunity to rely upon the presumption of superior rights in an initial custody determination “a trial court should apply the standard typically applied in parent-vs-parent modification cases[,]” which is whether “a material change in circumstances has occurred, which makes a change in custody in the child’s best interests.” Id. at 148. However, the Blair Court carved out four “extraordinary circumstances” in which parents continue to hold a presumption of superior rights against a non-parent:

(1) when no order exists that transfers custody from the natural parent; (2) when the order transferring custody from the natural parent is accomplished by fraud or without notice to the parent; (3) when the order transferring custody from the natural parent is invalid on its face; and (4) when the natural parent cedes only temporary and informal custody to the non-parents.

Id. at 143; see also Bryan, 2016 WL 4249291, at *9 (“[T]he fact that a non-parent has been awarded custody of a child does not necessarily prevent a biological parent from successfully asserting superior parental rights in a proceeding to regain custody of the child.”) When any of the four scenarios listed above are present in a case, “protection of the natural parent’s right to have the care and custody their child demands that they be accorded a presumption of superior parental rights against claims of custody by non-parents.” In re R.D.H., 2007 WL 2403352, at *7 (citing Blair, 77 S.W.3d at 143)). Moreover, this Court has held that we must focus on the “finality of the initial order, and not on the length of time that the custody arrangement has persisted.” Id. at *9.

Shaw v. Shaw, No. W2018-00677-COA-R3-CV, p. 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2022).

Under Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, “review of findings of fact by the trial court in civil actions shall be de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tenn. 2017).

Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. E2021-01283-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2022).

In non-jury cases such as this one, we review the trial court’s factual findings de novo upon the record, affording them a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013). We review questions of law de novo, affording the trial court’s decision no presumption of correctness. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692 (citing Mills v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn. 2012)). The trial court’s determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011).

…

We will not re-evaluate a trial court’s credibility determinations “‘absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.’” Davis v. Davis, 223 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)).

…

On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule for an abuse of discretion. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (citing Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). “A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule ‘only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.’” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (quoting Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88).

In re Lyric N., No. E2021-00578-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2022).

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). However, we review questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bowden, 27 S.W.3d at 916 (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)). The trial court’s determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

King v. Jones, No. M2020-01252-COA-R3-CV, p. 5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2022).

Mother contends that the court abused its discretion in adopting Father’s proposed parenting plan. A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard, reaches “an illogical or unreasonable decision,” or bases its decision “on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). Our review of discretionary decisions is limited to determining whether the trial court’s decision had the necessary factual support, whether the court identified and applied the correct law, and whether the court’s decision was “within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Id.

We review the trial court’s factual findings de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d); Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013). We give great deference to findings based on witness credibility, and we will not overturn such findings absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). “[T]rial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges.” Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d); Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692.

Stine v. Jakes, No. M2021-00800-COA-R3-JV, p. 12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2022).

This case was tried without a jury. Accordingly, under Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, our review of the trial court’s findings of fact is de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tarrant, 363 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tenn. 2012). The evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact when it supports another finding “with greater convincing effect.” Hardeman Cnty. v. McIntyre, 420 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). The trial court’s findings of fact must therefore contain sufficient underlying facts to clearly disclose the basis of the trial court’s determinations. Lovelace v. Coley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 34 (Tenn. 2013) (citations omitted). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Tenn. 2012).

Hall v. Hall, No. M2021-00757-COA-R3-CV, p. 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2022).

Concerning permanent parenting plan modifications, our High Court has
elucidated as follows:

A trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan serves a child’s best interests are factual questions. See In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, appellate courts must presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, trial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges. Massey-Holt v. Holt, 255 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, determining the details of parenting plans is “peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)). “It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. . . . A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88.

Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2013) (other internal citations omitted).

Smallbone v. Smallbone, No. M2020-01556-COA-R3-CV, p. 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2022).

The determination of a child’s best interest presents a question of fact. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013); In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, we “presume that a trial court’s factual findings on [best interest] are correct.” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693. We do not overturn the trial court’s best interest findings unless the evidence preponderates against them. Id.

Editor: But see this from page 9 of the opinion:

Based on our review, the court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning this residential schedule. The best interest analysis is a “particularly fact-intensive process.” McEvoy v. Brewer, No. M2001-02054-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22794521, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003). Our role is not to “tweak a visitation order in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). The court applied the correct law, the evidence does not preponderate against its factual findings, and its decision is within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. See Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). If Father’s predictions prove true and the joint parenting arrangement becomes unworkable, our legal system provides a remedy. See In re Emma E., No. M2008-02212-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 565630, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2010).

Editor:  And this on page10:

Even so, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in the allocation of decision-making authority.

Gergel v. Gergel, No. E2020-01534-COA-R3-CV, p.13-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2022).

Additionally, this Court reviews a trial court’s determination of an appropriate parenting plan according to an abuse of discretion standard. “[C]ustody and visitation arrangements are among the most important decisions confronting a trial court in a divorce case. The needs of the children are paramount; while the desires of the parents are secondary.” Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As this Court stated in Gaskill:

Custody and visitation determinations often hinge on subtle factors, including the parents’ demeanor and credibility during the divorce proceedings themselves. Accordingly, appellate courts are reluctant to second-guess a trial court’s decisions. Trial courts must be able to exercise broad discretion in these matters, but they still must base their decisions on the proof and upon the appropriate application of the applicable principles of law. Id. at 631.

Williams v. Williams, No. E2021-00432-COA-R3-CV, p. 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2022).

This Court reviews a trial court’s determination of an appropriate parenting plan according to an abuse of discretion standard. “[C]ustody and visitation arrangements are among the most important decisions confronting a trial court in a divorce case. The needs of the children are paramount; while the desires of the parents are secondary.” Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)

Baker v. McSherry,  No. M2020-01670-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2022).

A trial court’s determination of a child’s best interest is a question of fact. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013); In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). So appellate courts must “presume that a trial court’s factual findings on [best interest] are correct and not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings.” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693. In weighing the preponderance of the evidence, the trial court’s findings of fact that are based on witness credibility are given great weight, and they will not be overturned “absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). The details of a residential parenting schedule lie within the trial court’s discretion. See Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693.

A trial court abuses its discretion only if it applies an incorrect legal standard; reaches an illogical conclusion; bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence; or “employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008); see also Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 203-04 (Tenn. 2002); Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001). When reviewing a discretionary decision, we must determine: “(1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the lower court properly identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the lower court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010).

While a trial court has broad discretion in fashioning the details of a parenting plan, the touchstone is the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a); see also Maupin v. Maupin, 420 S.W.3d 761, 770 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). In the absence of a finding that the limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406 apply, a trial court’s goal is to craft a permanent parenting plan that promotes the child’s best interest, which requires consideration of the statutory best interest factors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a).

Liebetreu v. Liebetreu,  No. M2021-00623-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Mar. 18, 2022).

It is generally accepted that “the details of custody and visitation with children are peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge,” Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Tenn. App. 1973)), and that a trial judge’s decision “will not ordinarily be reversed absent some abuse of that discretion.” Id. In reviewing these decisions, “the welfare of the child has always been the paramount consideration.” Id. (quoting Luke v. Luke, 651 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. 1983)). Moreover, “the right of the noncustodial parent to reasonable visitation is clearly favored.” Id. (citing Weaver v. Weaver, 261 S.W.2d 145, 148 (1953)). Nevertheless, this favored right to visitation “may be limited, or eliminated, if there is definite evidence that to permit . . . the right would jeopardize the child, in either a physical or moral sense.” Id. (quoting Weaver, 261 S.W.2d at 148).

In reviewing a trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court will uphold the decision “so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tenn. 2000)). A trial court will be said to have abused its discretion “only when it ‘applie[s] an incorrect legal standard or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)). Under this standard of review, an appellate court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id. (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998)).

Killian v. Moore, No. M2020-01283-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022).

This case is ultimately about a change in child custody—a statutory term courts have equated to the designation of a “primary residential parent.” Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 703 (Tenn. 2013). When considering a motion to modify child custody, the threshold question a court must answer is whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the existing parenting plan. See C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tenn. 2017); see also Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 705.

“A material change of circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the child.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). Rather, “[a] material change of circumstance may include, but is not limited to, failures to adhere to the parenting plan or an order of custody and visitation or circumstances that make the parenting plan no longer in the best interest of the child.” Id. The party seeking to modify the existing parenting plan bears the burden to prove this material change by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. If a court finds there has been a material change in circumstances, then it must decide whether modification of the parenting plan is in the child’s best interest. If the court finds that there has been no material change in circumstances, it “‘is not required to make a best interest[ ] determination and must deny the request for a change of custody.’” Pippin, 277 S.W.3d at 405 (quoting Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)).

Whether a material change in circumstances has occurred is a factual question and one that appellate courts presume the trial court correctly determined unless evidence in the record preponderates otherwise. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692-93; see also TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d). No “bright line” test exists for determining whether a material change of circumstances has occurred. McClain v. McClain, 539 S.W.3d 170, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Oliver v. Oliver, No. M2002-02880-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 892536, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2004)). However, the reviewing court can consider the following principles in making this determination:

“First, the change of circumstances must involve either the child’s circumstances or a parent’s circumstances that affect the child’s well-being. Second, the changed circumstances must have arisen after the entry of the custody order sought to be modified. Third, the changed circumstances must not have been reasonably anticipated when the underlying decree was entered. Fourth, the change in circumstances must affect the child’s wellbeing in some material way.”

Canzoneri v. Burns, No. M2020-01109-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 3399860, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2021) (quoting McClain, 539 S.W.3d at 188). “Not every change in circumstance is a material change.” Gentile v. Gentile, No. M2014-01356-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 8482047, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2015). “‘The change must be significant before it will be considered material.’” Id. (quoting In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

With regard to our review of a court’s decision on a petition to modify a permanent parenting plan, the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated:

Because decisions regarding parenting arrangements are factually driven and require careful consideration of numerous factors, trial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make credibility determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate judges. Thus, determining the details of parenting plans is peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge. It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a [residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court. A trial court’s decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.

Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (alterations and omission in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014).

 Krulewicz v. Krulewicz, No. M2021-00190-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2022).

Our supreme court “has previously emphasized the limited scope of review to be employed by an appellate court in reviewing a trial court’s factual determinations in matters involving child custody and parenting plan developments.” C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692–93 (Tenn. 2013)). “A trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan serves a child’s best interests are factual questions.” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692–93 (citation omitted). Therefore, pursuant to Rule 13 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, “appellate courts must presume that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings.” Id. at 693 (citations omitted). “Indeed, trial courts are in a better position to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility; therefore, trial courts enjoy broad discretion in formulating parenting plans.” C.W.H., 538 S.W.3d at 495 (citations omitted). “On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision regarding parenting schedules for an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citations omitted). “A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a residential parenting schedule ‘only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.’” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (quoting Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)).

Alkateeb v. Alhouwari, No. W2020-01582-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022).

“A trial court’s decision regarding parenting time is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard[.]” In re Grace N., No. M2014-00803-COA-R3-JV, 2015 WL 2358630, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2014). Under this standard,

[t]rial courts have broad discretion to fashion parenting plans that best serve the interests of the children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2004). They must, however, base their decisions on the evidence presented to them and upon the proper application of the relevant principles of law. D v. K, 917 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). While we are reluctant to second-guess a trial court’s decisions regarding a parenting plan, see Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), we will not hesitate to do so if we conclude that the trial court’s decision is not supported by the evidence, that the trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, or that the child’s interests will be best served by another parenting arrangement. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001); Steen v. Steen, 61 S.W.3d at 328; Placenia v. Placenia, 3 S.W.3d 497, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 716 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).

Moore v. Moore, No. M2019-01065-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2022).

We review the trial court’s factual findings de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d); Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2013). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692.